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I. Payment of U.N. Dues
Due to repeated withholdings and nonpayment during the 1980s and 1990s, by 1999 the
United States had amassed a debt of $1.6 billion to the United Nations. Faced with the
imminent prospect of losing its vote in the U.N. General Assembly pursuant to article 19
of the U.N. Charter, which is automatically triggered when a country's arrearage exceeds
the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years,' in November
1999, President Clinton signed into law the Helms-Biden Bill (part of the State Department
Spending Bill), which authorizes $926 million2 over three years as payment of U.S. arrears
owed to the United Nations.
The legislation permitted the immediate payment of $100 million in back dues to the
United Nations (which was just enough to avoid loss of the U.S. vote in January 2000), but
stipulates the following pre-conditions to payment of the rest of the money:
(1) The United Nations must accept the $926 million as payment in full and agree to
write off the additional $800 million it calculates that the United States owes the
organization in an uncollectible "contested arrears account."
(2) The United Nations must agree to reduce the U.S. share of the regular U.N. budget
from twenty-five percent to twenty-two percent by 2001, and down to twenty percent
by 2002. It must also agree to reduce the U.S. share of the peacekeeping budget
from thirty-one percent to twenty-five percent by 2001.
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1. Under article 19 of the U.N. Charter, "[a] member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the
amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full
years." U.N. CHARTER art. 19.
2. The legislation authorizes $819 million in overdue payments to the U.N. and wipes out $107 million in
debt the world organization owes to the U.S. government.
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(3) The U.N. budget cannot include any growth in spending, even allowing for inflation.
In his speech to the U.N. Security Council on January 20, 2000, Senator Jesse Helms
(R-NC) warned that if the United Nations does not accept these conditions for payment
of U.S. arrears, not only will the U.N. forfeit hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, but the
United States might be forced to withdraw from the organization altogether.3
The unilateral, non-negotiable approach mandated by the Helms-Biden law is inconsis-
tent with the U.S. legal obligations under article 17 of the U.N. Charter.4 The United
States freely agreed to pay its assessments when it ratified the U.N. Charter and made the
treaty part of the supreme law of the United States. At that time, the Unites States joined
the other members of the organization in voting to set the U.S. assessment at twenty-five
percent for the U.N.'s general budget and thirty-one percent for the peacekeeping budget,
which reflected the U.S. share of the world economy.
It is worth noting that the current U.S. share of the world's gross domestic product
(twenty-seven percent) is actually higher than its current assessed share of the U.N. regular
budget (twenty-five percent). By way of comparison, the fifteen countries of the European
Union together pay thirty-six percent of the U.N. budget, while the European Union's
share of the world's gross domestic product is virtually the same as the United States
(twenty-seven percent).
Moreover, at the insistence of the United States, the U.N. annual budgets are adopted
by consensus, meaning the United States can unilaterally block U.N. spending if it chooses.'
Similarly, the United States wields control over the U.N.'s peacekeeping budget through
the exercise of its veto power in the Security Council, which must approve all peacekeeping
operations.
According to the negotiating record of the U.N. Charter, the decision of the International
Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case, 6 and prevailing state practice (including fre-
quent statements by the United States), once assessments are adopted under article 17, they
are legally binding.7 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which the United
States recognizes as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice),' states: "A
State party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform the treaty." Although U.S. courts have held that a later act of Congress
may supersede an earlier treaty obligation when the two conflict for purposes of domestic
law, the treaty obligations nevertheless remain on the international plane, and violations of
those obligations continue to be violations of international law.'0
From 1945 to 1980, the U.S. Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, adhered to a
bipartisan consensus that the United States had a legal duty to pay for whatever assessments,
to be used for whatever purpose, the collective membership of the United Nations deter-
3. See Joe Lauria, Senator Delivers a Warning to the U.N., THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2000, at A2.
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 17.
5. SeeJose E. Alvarez, Legal Remedies and the United Nations' A La Carte Problem, 12 MIcn.J. INT'L L. 229,
238 (1991).
6. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, Advisory Opinion (July 20).
7. Richard W. Nelson, International Law and U.S. Withholding of Payments to International Organizations, 80
Am.J. INT'L L. 973, 978 (1986).
8. See MESSAGE FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO U.S. SENATE, S. EXEC. Doe., 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1971).
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969).
10. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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mined are owing." During the Reagan administration, however, the United States first
began to fall behind in its payments to the U.N., unilaterally withholding its share of funds
budgeted for what it then considered objectionable organizations and programs.' The
Kasenbaum-Solomon amendment and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 resulted
in further reductions in U.S. appropriations to the U.N. Recognizing that these withhold-
ings were in violation of international law, the Bush administration had adopted a five-year
repayment plan, but in 1994 Congress reneged. 3 Although the Clinton administration has
also recognized that it has an international obligation to pay its U.N. arrears, the U.S. debt
to the United Nations has ballooned over the past eight years to over $1.6 billion.
Senator Biden himself recognized that the approach mandated by the Helms-Biden law
is inconsistent with America's international legal obligations, but felt that the current Con-
gress would not have approved any payment of U.S. arrears to the U.N. without the stip-
ulated conditions. When introducing the legislation, Senator Biden stated: "In an ideal
world I'd like to pay our arrears to the United Nations in full with no conditions," but
"[o]ur choices are this or nothing.' 4
The United States has an international legal obligation to pay the money that it owes
the United Nations in full and without condition. It is a violation of that obligation to
require that the United Nations agree to write off fifty cents on every dollar of U.S. debt
to the U.N., leaving the rest of the members to absorb the $800 million shortfall in the
U.S. arrears payment. It is a violation of that obligation to require that the U.N. agree to
maintain a zero-growth budget in perpetuity, even while the United States has pushed for
the creation of expensive new U.N. institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. And it is a violation of that obligation for a country
to make its payment of arrears contingent on non-negotiable demands for a decrease in the
percentage that it is assessed.
From a practical standpoint, the Helms-Biden legislation sets a dangerous precedent,
whereby other countries will be encouraged to withhold dues in order to coerce the mem-
bers of the U.N. to reduce their assessed share of the budget and forgive their arrears. Japan
(which pays nineteen percent of the U.N.'s budget) is poised to follow the U.S. example.
The Japanese Parliament is currently debating legislation similar to the Helms-Biden leg-
islation, which would pressure the U.N. to reduce Japan's assessment by several percentage
points."
Though the United Nations is desperately in need of the money owed to it by the United
States,'6 the indications are that its members are unlikely to accept the conditions stipulated
in the legislation. In that event, the bulk of U.S. arrears will not be paid, U.S. dues payments
for 2000 will fall short of the assessment for that year, putting the United States further in
arrears, and in January 2001, the United States will automatically forfeit its vote in the
General Assembly.
11. See Jose E. Alvarez, The United States Financial Veto, 90 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 319 (1996).
12. Seeid.
13. See WASH. POST WKLY. REP., Mar. 18, 1996.
14. Philip Shenon, Senate Backs U.N. Payment, But More Hurdles Remain, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1999, at A4.
15. U.S. Must Sweep Up After Helms, THE ATtLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 26, 2000, at 14-A.
16. In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on January 21, 2000,Joseph Connor, the U.N. Under
Secretary General for Management, testified that the organization remains teetered at the edge of bankruptcy.
"We borrow money from our regular budget to float peacekeeping operations. We then pay it back. The
United Nations is running on empty, we've got many miles to go, and most of those miles are in emergency
situations." James Rosen, Senators Say U.N. Needs Overhaul, THE NEws & OBSERVER, Jan. 22, 2000.
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II. The United Nations Security Council
The Security Council's primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace
and security.' 7 When there is a concern over a threat to peace, the Security Council may
make recommendations in an effort to resolve the dispute." If the dispute escalates, the
Council may undertake such action as assigning peacekeeping forces, imposing economic
and diplomatic sanctions, or authorizing the use of force. 19 The three main crises faced by
the Security Council in 1999 were the situations in Iraq, Kosovo, and East Timor. At the
same time, the Security Council faced accusations of unfair treatment of different parts of
the world, especially Africa.
A. IRAQ
Iraq continued to be a dominant issue for the Security Council in 1999. The year began
with Iraq's persistent refusal to comply with Security Council resolutions concerning its
disarmament. 0 In the aftermath of American and British air strikes in late 1998 and early
1999, Iraq terminated all cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM), which was set up in 1991 to investigate suspected Iraqi chemical and bio-
logical weapons production.2
In December 1999, after a year of negotiation, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1284 by a vote of eleven in favor, none against, and four abstaining.22 This resolution
established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC), which replaced UNSCOM. 3
Resolution 1284 authorizes UNMOVIC to take over UNSCOM's assets, liabilities, and
archives.24 The resolution also mandates UNMOVIC to "establish and operate ... a re-
inforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification... address unresolved disarmament
issues ... [and identify] as necessary ... additional sites in Iraq to be covered by the new
monitoring system."" According to Resolution 1284, if UNMOVIC reports that Iraq is
cooperating with the monitoring system, sanctions against Iraq would be suspended for 120
days. 2
6
Meanwhile, the Security Council continued to support the humanitarian "oil-for-food"
program by adopting a series of resolutions in 1999, authorizing Iraq to sell a limited




20. See Iraq Reaffirms Refusal to Cooperate with UN, AGENcE FRANcE PRESSE, Feb. 27, 1999.
21. See id. Iraq claimed that it would be in the other countries' economic interest ifthey violated the embargo.
22. See Security Council littablisbes New Monitoring Commission for Iraq Adopting Resolution 1284 (1999) by Vote
of 11-0-4, Press Release SC/6775, Dec. 17, 1999. China, France, Malaysia, and the Russian Federation abstained
from the voting.
23. S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4084th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1999). UNMOVICwas
established to replace the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which monitored the elimination
of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Iraq would have to cooperate in all respects for 120 days, and if it was determined Iraq was not
cooperating, the suspension of sanctions would be terminated.
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amount of oil and to purchase humanitarian supplies with the revenue under U.N. super-
vision. 7 On December 12, 1999, Resolution 1281 was adopted, permitting Iraq to sell $5.26
billion of oil and oil products for the next 180 days.2s The December extension came after
Iraq rejected two prior extensions and cut off its exports in November.2 9 Although the
program was aimed at improving the living conditions of the people of Iraq, this goal has
not been achieved because of Iraq's failure to pump the target amounts of oil and the
existence of a slump in world oil prices.30
B. Kosovo
Beginning in 1989, Serbia had instituted a repressive apartheid-like administration of its
"autonomous" province of Kosovo, whose population was comprised of ninety percent
Albanian Muslims and ten percent Serbs. In February 1999, internationally mediated peace
negotiations between the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the
Kosovo Albanians were held at Rambouillet, France. Despite international pressure and
even overt threats of military action, the negotiations ended with the FRY's refusal to sign
the Rambouillet accords.3" Using several attacks by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as
a pretext, the FRY began to ethnicly cleanse the region, ultimately resulting in the displace-
ment of over one million Kosovo Albanians.12
When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began a wave of military strikes
in March against Serb targets in response to this ethnic cleansing, the Security Council
held an immediate meeting to discuss the situation.33 The Russian Federation expressed
anger at the use of force without explicit Security Council authorization, which it contended
was in violation of the U.N. Charter.14 Resolutions 1199 and 1203, which were adopted in
1998, had invoked Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and recognized that the conflict in
Kosovo was a threat to the peace and security in the region.3 The resolutions also expressed
alarm at the "impending humanitarian catastrophe" and "reemphasiz[ed] the need to pre-
vent this from happening. 36 They did not, however, employ the talismanic phrase "all
27. See Security Council Extends Iraq "Oil-for-Food" Programme until December 4, Press Release SC/67 5 7, Nov.
19, 1999. The Oil-for-Food program was established pursuant to Resolution 986 (1995), which initially allowed
for sales of no more than $1 billion over 90 days. S.C. Res. 986, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3519th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/986 (1995). This program allows Iraq to sell oil to purchase humanitarian goods for the Iraqi
people.
28. See Security Council Extends Iraq "Oil-for-Food" Programme for 180 days, Adopting Resolution 1281 (1999)
Unanimously, Press Release SC/6769, Dec. 11, 1999.
29. See Iraq to Resume Oil Sales at End of Week, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 15, 1999.
30. See U.N. Panel Recommends Easing Sanctions on Iraq, DEurrcHE PRESsE-AGEcruR, Mar. 31, 1999. The U.N.
uses about sixty percent of the revenues to purchase humanitarian goods; the rest goes to compensation for
Gulf War victims and to pay for the cost of disarmament.
31. See One Year on, Kosovo No Closer to Peace, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 14, 1999. Belgrade was willing
to discuss an "international presence" in Kosovo if a "decent political accord" was reached. Kosovo wanted a
referendum that would allow for independence after three years.
32. See id. Of the 230,000 people, 30,000 fled after the peace talks began in February.
33. See NATO Action Against Serbian Military Targets Prompts Divergent Views, M2 PRESSWIRE, Mar. 25, 1999.
34. See id. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter emphasizes Charter obligations take precedence over all other
Charters, including NATO's.
35. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203,
U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
36. S.C. Res. 1203, supra note 35.
SUMMER 2000
784 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
necessary means," which the Council has always used in the past when authorizing use of
force."
On the eve of the air strikes, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy said NATO
did not seek explicit Security Council authorization for air strikes because some members
of the Council would have vetoed the plan .3 His forecast proved accurate. On the third
day of the air strikes, the trio of Belarus, India, and Russia proposed a draft resolution
charging that the NATO bombing violated articles 2(4), 24, and 53 of the U.N. Charter.
This proposal, however, was defeated by a vote of twelve to three (with only China, Russia,
and Namibia voting in favor). 9
After nearly eighty days of bombing, on June 10, 1999, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1244, which was intended to facilitate the end to the violence in Kosovo.40 The
resolution passed unanimously with only one country, China, abstaining.4' Resolution 1244
codifies the general principles adopted by the foreign ministers of the G-8, which were
accepted by Belgrade after mediation by the president of Finland and the special represen-
tative of the president of the Russian Federation. 42 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the
United Nations, expressed immediate support for the resolution, stating: "[tiheUnited
Nations is determined to lead the civilian implementation of the peace effectively and ef-
ficiently. But ... we need the cooperation of all the parties. And... the means to carry out
the mandate. '43
Pursuant to Resolution 1244, the Security Council authorized member states and appro-
priate international organizations to institute an international presence in Kosovo.44 The
responsibilities for this NATO-led peace operation included deterring renewed hostilities,
demilitarizing (but not disarming) the KLA, setting up a safe environment for the return
of refugees, and facilitating an environment where an international civil presence can func-
tion for at least one year.4
The Kosovo intervention set an unclear precedent for the United Nations. Some com-
mentators concluded that the unauthorized use of force "undermined the authority of the
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
38. NATO Avoided UN Veto, UPI, Mar. 31, 1991.
39. See Security Council Reects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N.
Press Release SC/6659, Mar. 26, 1999.
40. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 lth mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
41. See Security Council, Welcoming Yugoslavia's Acceptance of Peace Principles, Authorize Civil Security Presence
in Kosovo, Press Release SC/6686, June 10, 1999. China did not vote for the resolution because it failed to
reflect China's concerns about foreign intervention in internal matters. See China Abstains from Kosovo Peace
Plan Vote, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 10, 1999.
42. See Security Council, supra note 41. The first document was adopted on May 6 and the second document
was adopted on June 3. Both documents are included as annexes to Resolution 1244. The principles adopted
include, but are not limited to: "an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo; With-
drawal of the military, police and paramilitary forces; Deployment of effective international civil and security
presences, [with substantial NATO participation in the security presence]; establishment of an interim political
framework; The safe and free return of all refugees ... ; A political process providing for substantial self-
government, as well as the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); [and] comprehensive ap-
proach to the economic development of the crisis region." S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 40.
43. Sec-Gen says UN is Determined to Lead Civilian Implementation of Peace Effectively and Effciently, M2 PREss-
WIRE, June 11, 1999.
44. See S.C. Res. 1284, supra note 23.
45. See id.
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Security Council and diminished international respect for the rule of law."- Others contend
that "Council ratification after the fact in Resolution 1244-formal ratification by an affir-
mative vote of the Council-effectively ratified what earlier might have constituted unilat-
eral action questionable as a matter of law." 7 Still others view the precedent as a positive
development, authorizing collective humanitarian intervention in the face of Security
Council paralysis to respond to and prevent mass atrocities s.4
C. EAST TIMOR
East Timor has been on the U.N. agenda since 1960, when it was added as a Non-Self-
Governing Territory.49 In 1974, civil war broke out when Portugal sought to establish a
provisional government and unilaterally determine the status of East Timor."' When Por-
tugal could not control the fighting, it withdrew its forces. At this point, Indonesia inter-
vened and integrated East Timor as one of Indonesia's provinces.' Since 1974, the U.N.
Security Council has repeatedly called for Indonesia's withdrawal from East Timor.5 2
In 1998, talks began that would give East Timor limited autonomy from Indonesia, and
by May 1999, Portugal and Indonesia had signed an autonomy agreement.53 The Security
Council demonstrated its support for this agreement by adopting Resolution 1236.14 In-
donesia and Portugal then looked to the U.N. to conduct the voting of the East Timorese
people to determine if they would accept or reject the proposed special autonomy status."1
In June 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET) by adopting Resolution 1246.16 UNAMET's mandate was to organize and
conduct a popular referendum." On August 30, 1999, ninety-eight percent of East Ti-
morese voters turned out to vote on the special autonomy proposal."s The majority of the
voters rejected the proposed special autonomy status, instead voting to begin the transition
to full independence. 9 The Security Council immediately extended the UNAMET man-
46. Paul Williams & Michael P. Scharf, NATO Intervention on Trial: The Legal Case that Was Never Made,
I HumAN RIGHTs R. 103, 106 (2000).
47. Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of"Humanitarian Intervention," 93 Am.J.
INT'L L. 824, 827 (2000).
48. See Jonathan I. Charney, Antidpatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 834-41
(2000).
49. See Assembly Hails Onset of East Timor's Transitions to Independence, M2 PRESSWIRE, Dec. 20, 1999. In 1960,




53. See Chronology of Developments in East Timor, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 20, 1999. The proposed
autonomy arrangement would not include foreign affairs, finance, defense, or security.
54. S.C. Res. 1236, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3998th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1236 (1999); see Special Decol-
onization Committee Takes up Questions Related to East Timor and Western Sahara, M2 PREsswIRE, June 23, 1999.
This resolution accepted the agreement between Indonesia and Portugal as well as a May 1999 agreement
between the U.N. and the two countries concerning security arrangements.
55. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 40.
56. See S.C. Res. 1246, 54th Sess., 4013th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (1999).
57. Sec-Gen Informs Security Council People of East Timor Rejected Special Autonomy Proposed by Indonesia, M2
PsEsswRE, Sept. 6, 1999.
58. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 56. The vote was originally scheduled for August 8, 1999.
59. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 40. Of those who voted, 21.5 percent (94,388) voted for special autonomy
while 78.5 percent (344,580) voted against special autonomy. Following the announcement, pro-integration
militias started a campaign of violence across East Timor. As many as 500,000 people were displaced, including
UNAMET officials.
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date until the end of November by adopting Resolution 1262.60 After the announcement
of the vote for independence, violence erupted between Indonesian forces and the East
Timorese population and the Security Council adopted Resolution 1264, which established
a multinational force to protect the people of East Timor.61 UNAMET was then expanded
to increase its civilian police and military components.
62
In October 1999, the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly formally accepted the
result of the August referendum.61
After Indonesia's acceptance of the decision of the East Timor people, the Security Coun-
cil replaced UNAMET with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET), which it authorized through the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1272. 64
UNTAET was given responsibility for the temporary administration of East Timor, in-
cluding complete legislative and executive authority.65 UNTAET was also mandated to
work with the multinational force, which was deployed pursuant to Resolution 1264.66
UNTAET operates under the Security Council's authority and is supervised by a special
representative who is responsible for the mission's political, managerial, and representa-
tional functions.6
7
D. THE SECURITY CoUNCIL COMES UNDER CRITICISM
The Security Council was repeatedly criticized in 1999 for lack of transparency and not
treating each part of the world equally, especially Africa. In an October General Assembly
session, Mexico blasted the Security Council for conducting meetings in private.6 The
Security Council's own rules require public meetings, but allow private meetings in certain
situations.69 In defending the Council, Germany expressed understanding for the need for
private meetings, yet sympathized with the interests of third parties who are excluded from
these informal deliberations.' 0 India felt this secrecy led to inadequate and unsatisfactory
reporting." In the midst of this criticism, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sug-
gested adopting a system that would ultimately limit the Security Council's powers by giving
the General Assembly the power to endorse or veto certain Security Council resolutions."
60. S.C. Res. 1262, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4038th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1262 (1999).
61. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999).
62. See Security Council Adopts Resolution Extending Mandate of UN Mission in East Timor until November 30,
M2 PRESSWAE, Aug. 31, 1999. The extension of the U.N. presence was part of the agreement signed between
Portugal, Indonesia, and the United Nations in May 1999.
63. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 40.
64. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999); see Security Council
Established UN Transitional Administration in East Timor for Initial Period, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 6, 1999.
65. See S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 64, at para. 1. UNTAET is established to last untilJanuary 31, 2001. The
administrative responsibilities include the administration of justice.
66. See id. at para. 9. Although UNTAET is to work closely with the multinational force, UNTAET is to
replace the multinational force as soon as possible with its own military component.
67. See S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 64.
68. See Council Criticized for Secrecy, Slow Response in Africa as Assembly Continues Consideration of Report, M2
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During an open Security Council debate, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed the
importance of the Council avoiding the appearance of occasional or rhetorical reactions in
Africa without follow-up." Nigeria attacked the Security Council for its slow responses to
crises in Africa and not showing an adequate commitment when addressing Africa's prob-
lems14 It was also stressed that the Council needs to focus on better and more efficient
funding of peacekeeping operations." For example, in Kosovo, the international community
spent about $1.50 each day for each refugee, while in Rwanda and Sierra Leone each refugee
received an equivalent of $.11.16 The West was willing to spend $40 billion to fight a war
in the Balkans, but was unwilling to spend one percent of that to save lives of millions in
Africa."
Although Africa has not been a strong focus of the Security Council in the past years,
Africa is expected to feature prominently in the Security Council's agenda in 2000.8 The
Security Council began to take steps to show support for Africa in October 1999 by ap-
proving a peacekeeping force of 6,000 for Sierra Leone.79
III. The International Law Commission
The International Law Commission (ILC) is a U.N. advisory group responsible for as-
sisting the United Nations "to codify and progressively develop international law." 0 The
ILC is made up of "experts having recognized competence in international law."', The ILC
held its fifty-first session from May 3 to July 23, 1999 at the U.N. office at Geneva. The
ILC discussed seven topics at this session. The topics gaining the most attention were "state
responsibility," "nationality in relation to the succession of states," and "unilateral acts."
A. STATE REsPONSISILIrv
The ILC received comments and observations from governments on the provisionally
adopted draft articles concerning state responsibility. Chapter 3 of part I of the draft articles,
dealing with a breach of an international obligation, was most criticized by governments
and commentators.8 " The Special Rapporteur acknowledged that the current provisions do
not satisfactorily deal with the tension between conflicting treaty obligations andjus cogens
73. See Fifty Speakers Address Security Council During Day-Long Open Meeting on Situation in Africa, M2 PRESS-
WIRE, Dec. 16, 1999.
74. See S.C. Res. 1264, supra note 61.
75. See S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 64.
76. See Two-day Security Council Meeting Hears 54 Speakers on Secretary General's 1998 Report on Aftica, M2
PRESSWIRE, Oct. 1, 1999.
77. See id.
78. See Mustapha Kamil, Africa to Feature Prominently on UNAgenda, Bus. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999.
79. See Criticized over Africa, Security Council Meets on Sierra Leone, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 22, 1999.
The Security Council also authorized a force of 10,000 soldiers and police for East Timor.
80. B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: ITS APPROACI TO THE CODIFICATION AND
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1977).
81. M.R. ANDERSON ET AL., EDS., THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 22 (1998).
82. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of lts Fifty-First Session, U.N. GAOR Inter-
national Law Commission, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Corr. 1 & 2, U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (1999) [hereinafter
Report of the ILC].
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norms. As a result, "conflicts of obligations might arise that could not be resolved by general
legal processes." 3
In 1969, when the Commission drafted the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
it decided "that co-existing bilateral-or even, in some circumstances, multilateral-obli-
gations by one State to different States did not result in the invalidity of the underlying
treaty, but were to be resolved within the framework of State responsibility."84 The inter-
relationship between the law of state responsibility and the law of treaties was a strong
concern of the Special Rapporteur. In order
to solve the problem of a treaty obligation conflicting with a new peremptory norm of general
international law (us cogens), for example, by invoking article 62 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties on a fundamental change of circumstances was to minimize the overriding
importance and solemnity ofjus cogens embodied in articles 53 and 64.5
Also, the Vienna Convention provided different consequences for nullification of a treaty
as a result of conflict with a norm ofjus cogens16
In addition, the law of treaties addresses treaties in their entirety. If a treaty was incon-
sistent with ajus cogens norm, the effect would be to invalidate the entire treaty.87 During
the debate over article 16, members of the Commission referred to the International Court
of Justice decision in the Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project," which noted "the
law of treaties determined whether there was a treaty, who were the parties to the treaty
and in respect of what provisions and whether the treaty was in force."89 Along these lines,
the scope of the law of treaties and of state responsibility was different, regardless if they
were interrelated.
°
B. NATIONALITY IN RELATION TO SUCCESSION OF STATES
The Commission adopted a set of draft articles on the "nationality of natural persons in
relation to the Succession of States." The articles address the loss and acquisition of na-
tionality and the right of option concerning instances of succession of states. 9' The scope
of the draft articles is limited to the nationality of individuals and does not address the
nationality of legal persons (e.g., businesses and organizations).92
The draft articles were adopted to meet the international community's concern as to the
resolution of nationality problems dealing with succession of states. 93 Article I: Right to a
Nationality, is the cornerstone and essence of the draft articles. It provides: "Every individ-
ual who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of the predecessor State,
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of at least one of the States concerned, in accordance with the present draft articles."1 The
most important aspect of article I is that it recognizes an individual's right to a nationality
in the aftermath of a succession of States.9 "Article I applies the principle of article 15 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was the first international instrument
embodying the right of everyone to a nationality. ' '96
The Commission acknowledged that the positive nature of article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights has been disputed. For example, it has been argued that "it
is not possible to determine the State vis-a-vis which a person would be entitled to present
a claim for nationality, i.e. the addressee of the obligation corresponding to such a right."97
However, it is possible to identify such a State in the situation of a succession of States: it
is either the successor State(s), or the predecessor State.98
In some cases of State succession, persons may have ties to multiple States. Conceivably,
a person could end up with multiple nationalities, or he or she may choose only one.
However, in the case of State succession, a person is not to be denied the right to the
nationality of at least one of the States involved. 99 This is the underlying purpose behind
article I, as evidenced by the phrase, "has the right to the nationality of at least one of
the States concerned." °° However, the draft articles do not specifically address the issue of
the possibility of multiple nationalities. The articles leave this issue for each State to
decide. 101
C. UNILATERAL ACTS OF STATES
The Commission believed that "unilateral acts of states" was an important aspect of
everyday international law and that there was some uncertainty as to what law was applicable
to them. 2 The Commission acknowledged a need for the topic's codification and devel-
opment in order for there to be a specific aspect of international law that would serve to
prevent such unilateral acts from becoming sources of disputes or conflicts.13
Yet, several members of the Commission believed that the proposed draft articles on
Unilateral Acts of States too closely paralleled the articles of the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. °4 They did not believe "that a provision included in the Vienna
Convention could automatically be transferred mutatis mutandis to the draft articles on
unilateral acts, because of the divergent nature of these acts as against treaties."'' 0 There
are many rules in the Vienna Convention as a result of the meeting of wills of States parties
to a treaty, which was an element absent from unilateral acts.0 6
Other members of the Commission took the position that the 1969 Vienna Convention
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on the Law of Treaties was a very helpful and invaluable guideline.' 0 Some members of the
Commission went so far as to say that it was not followed close enough in the draft articles
and that the Special Rapporteur should also take into account the 1986 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between Inter-
national Organizations. 08 Because many procedural and other relevant matters were not ad-
dressed in the present draft articles, following provisions of the law of treaties and on such
issues as rules of interpretation, modification, suspension, termination, and others would ap-
pear to be warranted.°9 The Special Rapporteur noted that there were important differences
between treaty acts and unilateral acts. Treaty acts were based on an agreement involving two
or more subjects of international law, but unilateral acts were based on an expression of will
(individual or collective) intent on creating a new legal relationship that was not an aspect of
the act."1 It should be taken into consideration that a State usually developed a unilateral act
"when it could not or did not wish to negotiate a treaty act, i.e., when, for political reasons,
it did not wish to enter into negotiations." "' The Special Rapporteur expressed the view that
the Commission needed to be wary of political realities and the views of States, in that they
would probably result in the preference of rules that did not restrict States' "political and legal
freedom of action in the international field.""
12
IV. International Financial Institutions
The beginning of 1999 was marked by staunch criticism of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially for their respective roles in the Asian fi-
nancial crisis." 3 Critics accused the twin financial bodies of "promot[ing] policies designed
to undermine the role of the state in social and economic activity,""14 which led to increased
unemployment, inflation, and poverty in the region."15 In addition, the World Bank and the
IMF were chastised for their lack of transparency and accountability to their client coun-
tries. 16 Hence, 1999 began a year of reformation for the World Bank and the IME
In a tandem effort to polish their tarnished image, the World Bank and the IMF have
proposed a new poverty reduction plan entitled "Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper"
(PRSP)."' The purpose of PRSP is to provide total debt relief to developing countries that
qualify."8 Likely recipients are Bolivia, Mauritania, Uganda, and Mozambique." 9
A. WORLD BANK
In its struggle to regain credibility, the World Bank instituted reforms that would reassert
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its analytical phase, the World Bank issued a self-critical evaluation concerning its failure
to acknowledge rampant corruption as well as social and financial inequities in Indonesia."2'
This report prompted the World Bank to reach beyond its fiscal concerns in order to
humanize itself by implementing programs that strengthen the social and economic struc-
ture of developing countries, stimulate private sector growth, fight corruption, and assist
countries plagued by post-conflict instability."'
1. Strengthening the Social and Economic Structure of Developing Countries
By investing in such basic social services as education, nutrition, and maternal health
care, the World Bank hopes to bring a better way of life to many rural poor and women." 3
For example, some of the $40 billion targeted for social and economic improvements has
gone to the Balochistan Province in Pakistan where girls schools were built in rural villages,
female teachers were hired, and the attendance of girls in these schools continues to climb.124
The year 1999 also illustrated once again that the goal of social and economic improve-
ment may conflict with other humanitarian objectives. In an effort to ameliorate the eco-
nomic plight of 58,000 impoverished Han Chinese farmers, in June 1999, the World Bank
granted China a $160 million loan to relocate the farmers from overworked land in the
east, to traditionally Tibetan lands in western China.' This finance package was narrowly
approved over the opposition of Japan, the United States, and eleven of the twenty-four
executive directors of the World Bank, who expressed concern that China would seize the
opportunity to dilute the Tibetan population in the region.Y2 6
2. Stimulation of Private Sector Growth
In December 1999, the World Bank reorganized its private sector development capabil-
ities by creating a closer link between itself and its private sector arm, the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), in order to encourage small business enterprises in developing
countries.' The new structure seeks to teach local financial institutions how to finance
small and medium size businesses. 2 Moreover, the new unit will be equipped to advise
industries in developing countries involved in the mingling of public policy and private
sector transactions through three new product groups dealing with telecommunications,
oil, gas, petrochemicals, and mining.12 9 According to Peter Woicke, executive vice president
of the IFC and a managing director of the World Bank,
[tihe combination of the experience and expertise of the World Bank to help countries create
a strong enabling environment for the private sector, and IFC's private sector knowledge and
120. See The World Bank Group, What Does the World Bank Do? (visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/about/programs.htn> [hereinafter World Bank].
121. See generaly World Bank Criticizes Itself OverIndonesia, SEA-TLE TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, available in 1999
VVL 6256849.
122. See World Bank, supra note 120.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See generally Japan Not Yet Decided on World Bank Loan to China, ASIAN EcoN. NEws, June 28, 1999.
126. See generally id.
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ability to execute successful investments, will make for a much more powerful agent for private
sector development in our member countries .... 30
Recently, the World Bank, via the IFC, boosted private sector investments in Russia and
China. Russia, which has been harshly reprimanded and denied financing by the World
Bank in recent years, secured a $100 million loan to continue reforms and "ensure an
efficient and economically viable coal-mining industry in Russia."'' Meanwhile, in China,
the IFC invested $19 million in Shanxi International Casting, a former state factory that
manufactures automobile body parts.' 32 The money is earmarked for modernization to keep
the company competitive and to aid its expansion into the British, American, and Japanese
markets.'33
3. Fighting Corruption and Assisting Countries Plagued by Conflict
The World Bank has implemented an anti-corruption program to assist developing
nations to identify and execute institutional reforms affecting financial regulations, trans-
parency in the public sector, and accountability of shareholder and creditor rights in the
private sector.14 It has accomplished this goal by organizing workshops, courses, and train-
ing programs for public officials and society in general. 3
In addition, the World Bank is working to stabilize countries plagued by conflict by
rebuilding infrastructure, supporting economic recovery, and reintegrating displaced pop-
ulations. 3 6 To date, the World Bank has assisted in the Balkans, Burundi, Cambodia, Sierra
Leone, and Haiti.'3 7
B. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Early in 1999, the IMF conceded, in a self-critical study, that it made mistakes in the
Asian financial crisis of 1997, resulting in aggravated economic conditions in the region,
especially in Indonesia. 3 ' However, it refused to apologize for its tight money approach of
forcing countries to inflate interest rates to fortify their currencies and keep inflation in
check.' 39 The IMF cited increased capital outflows and optimistic projections, which led to
a premature reduction in government spending, as the primary reasons for the failed
bailout. 4
Indonesia was hit the hardest by the miscalculations of the IMF because early in the crisis
the IMF decided to close sixteen of the 220 banks in Indonesia, which sent the monetary
130. Id.
131. World Bank Positively Assesses the Russian Government's Economic Activity, RuSSIAN EcoN. NEws, Dec. 29,
1999.
132. See Mark O'Neill, IFC Reveals Commitment Via $19m Factory Loan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 18,
2000.
133. See id.
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policy of the country spinning out of control.14 1 The closures created widespread panic,
which led to unexpected withdrawals from the banking system. 42 Another factor that con-
tributed to Indonesia's suffering was its political turmoil, which led to repeated modifica-
tions to the IMF's recovery program. 143 The IMF asserted that Thailand and South Korea
were not as affected because they tightened monetary policies in accordance with IMF
recommendations.'" The failed effort of the IMF to save Asia from financial catastrophe
has spawned numerous reforms that have recently been evaluated. There are four main
areas of reform: transparency, strengthening financial systems, private sector involvement,
and systemic aspects. 45
1. Transparency
The purpose of this reform is to "foster improved decision-making, financial system
stability, and economic performance...'."- The proposal includes encouraging partici-
pants to release Public Information Notices (PIN) pertaining to the surveillance of member
countries, IMF analysis of policy issues, 147 the public release of Letters of Intent and other
country documents that describe IMF-supported programs. 48 The IMF has also begun to
make financial information about itself available through its web site. 49
2. Strengthening Financial Systems
The objective of this reform is to assist in the supervision of financial markets by strength-
ening banking regulations."s0 Moreover, the IMF wants to encourage joint efforts between
it and the World Bank,"' such as the PRSP mentioned above. Lastly, the IMF is "en-
hanc[ing] analysis of financial sector vulnerabilities ... the preparation of economic adjust-
ment programs, and technical assistance.""2
3. Private Sector Involvement
The IMF will attempt to consult the private sector concerning issues of financial crisis
management, while simultaneously maintaining the financial flow between nations.'"1 In
addition, the IMF is attempting to strengthen the relationship between creditors and debt-
ors through improved dialogue; in fact, so far this proposal has been effective with Mexico,
Argentina, and South Africa."5
4. Systemic Aspects
The IMF recognizes that it must continuously challenge itself to stay abreast of the ever-
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rate analysis and the liberalization of capital accounts."' Furthermore, the IMF must
continue its efforts to assist developing countries in efforts to reduce poverty by encourag-
ing high-quality growth, improved social policies, and debt reduction for qualifying
countries.1
5 6
V. North American Regional Organizations
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the so-called "side agree-
ments" to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), created the first two
North American regional organizations concerned with environmental and labor issues.'
A. COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
1. Background
In the NAAEC, the three North American countries undertook several environmental
obligations. Most important, each party committed to "effectively enforce its environmental
laws and regulations,. . ." and to "ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels
of environmental protection .... ,,,8 In large part to facilitate implementation of these gen-
eral obligations, the NAAEC also created a regional environmental organization: the Com-
mission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC).' 9
The CEC has three components: a Council composed of the parties' environmental
ministers (or their equivalents'6°), a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.
The Council is the governing body of the CEC. It has a broad mandate to promote and
facilitate cooperation between the parties with respect to environmental matters,' 16 as well
as specific responsibilities such as monitoring the environmental effects of NAFTA. 62 The
ministers meet formally only once a year, but their representatives meet more frequently.
155. See id.
156. See generally id.
157. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993)
[hereinafter NAAEC]; North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499
(1993) [hereinafter NAALC]. Another side agreement to NAFTA created two U.S.-Mexico institutions: the
Border Environment Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank. See Agreement
between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Mexican States Concerning
the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development
Bank, Nov. 18, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1545 (1993). These institutions joined two longstanding North American
binational organizations: the U.S.-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission and the U.S.-
Canada International Joint Commission, created respectively by the Treaty Relating to the Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944,59 Stat. 1219, and theTreaty
Relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the United States and
Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
158. NAAEC, supra note 157, arts. 3, 5. For a good description of the history and content of the NAAEC,
see PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRi BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IM-
PLEMENTING THE NEw CONTINENTAL LAW (1996).
159. See NAAEC, supra note 157, art. 8. See generally the CEC web page, <http://www.cec.org>, which
contains Council decisions, Secretariat reports, press releases, and other information about CEC activities.
160. The U.S. government has named the EPA Administrator to be the U.S. representative to the Council.
See Exec. Order No. 12,915 (1994).
161. SeeNAAEC, supra note 157, art. 10(1).
162. See id. arts. 10(3)-(9).
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The Council chooses an executive director, who appoints and supervises the rest of the
Secretariat staff.163 The Secretariat is based in Montreal. The current executive director is
Janine Ferretti of Canada, who was appointed in June 1999 to a three-year term. Like
secretariats of other international organizations, the CEC Secretariat takes instructions only
from the Council rather than from individual parties. 64 Its general responsibility is to pro-
vide technical and administrative support to the Council.16s The NAAEC also gives the
Secretariat several specific mandates. In particular, the Secretariat may receive submissions
from any non-governmental organization or person asserting that a party has failed to
effectively enforce its environmental law. 166 If a submission meets specific requirements, the
Secretariat may recommend that the Council approve (by a two-thirds vote) preparation of
a factual record on it.16 The Secretariat may also prepare a report on its own initiative on
virtually any environmental issue other than those concerning parties' failures to effectively
enforce their environmental laws.
16
The Joint Public Advisory Committee JPAC) is composed of five individuals from each
country. Its mandate is to provide advice and information to the Council and Secretariat
on matters within the scope of the Agreement. 69 The current chair of the JPAC is Regina
Barba of Mexico.
The NAAEC also creates a dispute resolution procedure, under which any party that
believes that another party is engaging in a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce
its environmental law may request the Council to convene (by a two-thirds vote) an arbitral
panel to hear the claim. If the disputing parties are unable to agree on an action plan after
receiving the panel report, the panel may impose an action plan or fines. If a party does
not pay a fine, the other parties may suspend NAFTA benefits. 10
2. 1999 Activities
The CEC divides its programs into four general areas. In the area of Environment,
Economy, and Trade, the CEC published a methodology to evaluate the environmental
effects of NAFTA. It also launched a market study of "shade coffee," i.e., coffee grown
under the canopy of tropical forests rather than on clear-cut fields. In the area of Conser-
vation of Biodiversity, the CEC worked with public and private organizations to identify a
network of bird habitats throughout North America that should receive protection. In the
program area of Pollutants and Health, the Council announced in June 1999 the devel-
opment of a North American Regional Action Plan (NARAP) to reduce releases of dioxins,
furans, and hexachlorobenzene. (NARAPs launched in previous years have made great
strides in reducing regional production of DDT, mercury, and chlordane.) In August 1999,
the Secretariat published the third annual "Taking Stock" report, which provides an over-
view of pollution by each state and province in the United States and Canada.
163. See id. arts. 11(1)-(2).
164. See id. art. 11(4).
165. See id. art. 11(5).
166. See id. art. 14. The submissions procedure may be seen as a way to promote compliance by each party
with its obligation to "effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations."
167. See id. art. 15.
168. See id. art. 13.
169. See id. art. 16.
170. See id. pt. 5.
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In the Law and Policy program area, the Secretariat continued to administer the sub-
missions procedure. Only two submissions were filed in 1999, both of which were against
the United States. As of January 1, 2000, the CEC had received a total of twenty-two
submissions, of which eight were directed at Canada, eight at Mexico, and six at the United
States. Of the twenty-two submissions, eight had been dismissed by the Secretariat, one
had been withdrawn by the submitter, and one had resulted in a 1997 factual record con-
cerning Mexico. Of the other twelve submissions, the Secretariat was developing one factual
record (concerning Canada); the Secretariat had recommended that the Council authorize
development of two other factual records (both concerning Canada); and the remaining
nine were under review at earlier points in the procedure.' 7'
No party has ever requested consultations under part five of the NAAEC, the necessary
first step for triggering the Agreement's procedures for resolution of inter-state disputes.
In fact, the Council has yet to approve the model rules that would govern dispute resolution
proceedings.'72
B. COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION
1. Background
The NAALC is similar to the NAAEC in several respects. Like the NAAEC, the NAALC
establishes several obligations concerning labor issues, of which the most important are
probably each party's commitments to "promote compliance with and effectively enforce
its labor law" and to "ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high labor
standards ... "I" And like the NAAEC, the NAALC establishes a regional organization,
the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC), to facilitate implementation of those
obligations.'74
The CLC has two components: a Council composed of the parties' labor ministers (or
their equivalents), and a Secretariat. The Council directs the activities of the Secretariat
and promotes cooperative activities among the parties on a wide range of labor issues. "' It
chooses an executive director, who appoints and supervises the rest of the Secretariat staff.7
6
In addition to providing general support for the Council, the CLC Secretariat has a specific
mandate to prepare reports on a wide range of labor issues at the request of the Council.'77
The NAALC also requires each party to create a National Administrative Office (NAO)
to serve as points of contact and sources of information for the Secretariat, the other parties,
and the public.'" The NAO's most important function may be to receive complaints from
the public regarding labor practices in the other two countries. 179 After reviewing a com-
171. See Registry of Submissions on Enforcement Matters, available at <http://www.cec.org>.
172. In 1995, the ABA proposed that the Council consider adopting model rules prepared by a joint working
group of the three North American bar associations. See Jay M. Vogelson, Dispute Resolution Under the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 30 Ilrr'L LAw. 198 (1996).
173. NAALC, supra note 157, arts. 2, 3.
174. See id. art. 8. See generally Commission for Labor Cooperation (visited June 17, 2000) <http://
www.naalc.org>.
175. See id. arts. 10, 11.
176. See id. art. 12.
177. Seeid. art. 14.
178. Seeid. art. 16.
179. See id. art. 16(3). For a good short description of the CLC complaints procedure, see Lance Compa,
NAFTA's Labor Side Accord: A Tbree-Year Accounting, 3 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 6 (1997).
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plaint, a NAO may recommend consultations at the Council level. Following consultations,
any state party may request an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) to examine patterns
of practice by both parties (the requesting party as well as the subject of the communication)
in the enforcement of their technical labor standards8O ECEs may not investigate issues
concerning the rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike. Following an ECE
report on enforcement of occupational safety and health, child labor, or minimum wage
laws, a party may request the Council to convene (by a two-thirds vote) an arbitral panel
to consider whether there has been a persistent failure to effectively enforce the labor
standards.'' As under the NAAEC, the panel reports may lead to an action plan, fines, and,
ultimately, suspension of NAFTA benefits.
2. 1999 Activities
At its annual meeting in October 1999, the Council appointed Dr. Alfonso Onate La-
borde of Mexico to a three-year term as executive director. The Council also decided to
move the headquarters of the Secretariat from Dallas to Washington, D.C. in 2000.
In past years, cooperative CLC activities have primarily addressed three areas: workplace
safety and health; employment and training; and labor legislation and workers' rights. In
1999, there were three conferences on safety and health, two in Mexico (one on workplace
safety and health generally, and one on safety and health in the bottling industry), and one
in Winnipeg (focusing on the mining industry).
As of the end of 1999, the NAOs had received a total of twenty-one submissions: three
to the Canadian NAO (one concerning Mexico and two concerning the United States); five
to the Mexican NAO (all concerning the United States); and thirteen to the U.S. NAO
(eleven concerning Mexico and two concerning Canada). Two of the submissions were filed
in 1999, one to the U.S. NAO (concerning Mexico), and one to the Canadian NAO (con-
cerning the United States). Ten of the submissions had resulted in NAO requests for min-
isterial consultations. The consultations had generally led to workshops, conferences, and
follow-up reports. For example, a 1997 submission to the U.S. NAO alleging employment
discrimination based on pregnancy in certain Mexican maquiladoras led to a March 1999
conference in M~rida, Mexico on the "rights of women in North America," and outreach
sessions in border communities on women's legal protections against discrimination. No
party has ever requested an ECE or an arbitral panel.
180. See NAALC, spra note 157, art. 23.
181. See id. art. 29.
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